A colleague of mine, an active advocate for identification and
treatment of postpartum mental illness, recently posed an interesting concern.
With Susan Smith- who in 1995 infamously drowned her children- in the news again because she and Boston Marathon Bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev have the same
lawyer-my colleague wondered if there was insufficient attention to Smith's postpartum psychosis.
As I reviewed the media coverage, both of the original trial and Judy
Clarke, Tsarnaev's and Smith's shared lawyer, I discovered that she was right-
there was little to no mention of postpartum psychosis. However, Clarke's
tactic clearly achieved her goal of portraying her client's humanity and
vulnerability.
Smith was spared the death penalty because Clarke uncovered a story of significant early childhood trauma and abuse. Smith's
father committed suicide when Smith was 6, and her stepfather sexually abused
her in a secret relationship that continued in to her adulthood. A
newspaper article from 1996 quotes Clarke:
This is not a case about evil. . . . This is a case about despair and sadness...Her choices were irrational and her decisions were tragic. She made a horrible, horrible decision to be at that lake that night. She made that decision with a confused mind and a heart without hope. . . . [But] confusion is not evil, and hopelessness is not malice.
What does it mean to
conceptualize “mental illness” as separate and distinct from trauma? One could say that, with the context offered of childhood maltreatment, a "confused mind and
heart without hope" is a more evocative description than "postpartum
psychosis."
Her question got me thinking about compelling research by
psychiatrist Martin Teicher about the neurobiological underpinnings of adult
mental illness in the wake of childhood maltreatment.
Conduction a vast literature review, Teicher and colleagues
differentiated two groups with psychiatric disorders, diagnosed according to
the DSM system, with depression, anxiety, substance abuse and PTSD. One group
had experienced maltreatment and another had not.
Maltreatment is broadly defined as being “characterized by
sustained or repeated exposure to events that usually involve a betrayal of
trust.”
It includes not only physical and sexual abuse, but also emotional
abuse, including exposure to domestic violence, humiliation and shaming, as
well as emotional and physical neglect. The incidence of childhood maltreatment
ranges from about 14% in one-year prevalence to 42% in retrospective reviews
covering the full 18 years of childhood.
The way maltreatment is defined has great significance in the way
we think about the connection between childhood experiences and adult mental
illness. The word “trauma” itself may convey a kind of “not me” response, but
when the term is defined in this way, we see that these experiences are, in
fact, ubiquitous.
Teicher and colleagues found two subtypes, with significant behavioral
and neurobiological differences, despite the fact that individuals in both
groups carry the same diagnosis. Those with maltreatment history have earlier
age of onset, more severe symptoms, greater suicide risk and poorer response to
treatment. There are distinct differences in brain structure and function,
stress response, as well as epigenetic changes in gene expression.
These findings offer a window in to how childhood maltreatment
gets in to the body and brain. They have great significance in terms of
prevention, intervention and treatment. Focusing efforts on supporting young
children and their families is a natural conclusion. There are implications for
treatment of adults as well. Teicher writes:
Recent recommendations for adults with maltreatment- related posttraumatic stress are to adopt a sequential approach that begins with safety, education, stabilization, skill building, and development of the therapeutic alliance before endeavoring to revisit or rework the trauma, as this may be destabilizing.
He expresses
concern over the way these two distinct groups have not been differentiated.
Overall, we suspect that unknowingly mixing maltreated and nonmaltreated subtypes in treatment trials may have left us with an incomplete understanding of risks and benefits. Stratifying study subjects by maltreatment history may provide more definitive insights and delineate a clearer course of action for each subtype.
In other words, rather than treating psychiatric diagnosis
according to the current DSM system, that looks at symptoms and seeks to
eliminate those symptoms, it is
critical, in determining appropriate treatment, that we explore the developmental
and historical context of the symptoms.
In his conclusion Teicher writes:
We propose using the term ecophenotype to delineate these psychiatric conditions. We specifically recommend, as a first step, adding the specifier “with maltreatment history” or “with early life stress” to the disorders discussed here so that these populations can be studied separately or stratified within samples. This will lead to a richer understanding of differences in clinical presentation, genetic underpinnings, biological correlates, treatment response, and outcomes.
If Susan Smith did have postpartum psychosis, then certainly the
specifier “with maltreatment history” would have been indicated. Teicher’s work
has relevance to this story in two ways. By supporting new families who are
struggling in the face of parental mental illness, we offer the best
opportunity to prevent mental illness in the next generation. In addition, as
evidenced by Clarke’s success in avoiding the death penalty for her client, by telling the story of the individual, rather than simply naming an
illness, we evoke the full complexity of experience that a current DSM
diagnosis, without this specifier, does not.